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Abstract
A recent study has shown that short-term training in response inhibition can make people more cautious for up to two
hours when making decisions. However, the longevity of such training effects is unclear. In this study we tested whether
training in the stop-signal paradigm reduces risky gambling when the training and gambling task are separated by 24
hours. Two independent experiments revealed that the aftereffects of stop-signal training are negligible after 24 hours. This
was supported by Bayes factors that provided strong support for the null hypothesis. These findings indicate the need to
better optimise the parameters of inhibition training to achieve clinical efficacy, potentially by strengthening automatic
associations between specific stimuli and stopping.
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Introduction
Convergent clinical evidence suggests that executive control in
the motor domain might share mechanisms with high-level
decision-making. Poor response inhibition during adolescence
predicts later substance dependence [1], and response-inhibition
deficits have been observed in impulse-control disorders [2,3],
such as attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder [4], substance
abuse disorders [5,6], and gambling disorders [7–10]; but see also
[11]. More generally, problem gambling and substance addiction
involve a shift from novelty-seeking, impulsive behaviour (acting
quickly in pursuit of reward without consideration of adverse
consequences) to compulsive behaviour (acting persistently with
diminished regard for reward and despite adverse consequences);
and response inhibition has been linked to both constructs [12,13].
Thus, several authors have argued that response inhibition could
play an important role in the development and maintenance of
addictions and influence the outcome of treatments [12,14–17].
Inspired by these empirical findings and the central role of
response inhibition in neurobiological models of addiction, we
recently examined whether asking people to stop simple move-
ments had a causal effect on gambling [18]. To this end, we
combined a stop-signal task with a ‘decision-making under
uncertainty’ task that involved a certain element of risk (i.e.
subjects could either win or lose points). Successful stop-signal
performance requires an inhibitory control network, which
includes (among other areas) the right inferior frontal gyrus, right
middle frontal gyrus, pre-supplementary motor area, and basal
ganglia [2,3,19,20]. The right frontal areas have been linked to
self-control and inhibition in multiple domains [21–23]. There-
fore, we used a variant of the stop-signal task to explore whether
motor control would transfer to monetary decision-making when
gambling [18].
On every trial of our novel gambling task, participants were
presented with 6 choice options. Each option was associated with a
certain amount they could win; however, they were informed at
the beginning of the experiment that wins were less probable for
higher amounts. Healthy participants performed this task
throughout the session. In some blocks (‘load’ blocks), participants
had to perform a second task when an occasional signal occurred.
Participants in the ‘stop’ condition attempted to stop the planned
choice response, whereas participants in the ‘double-response’
condition executed a second response on trials where the signal
occurred. We found that participants in the stop group not only
became more cautious when executing their choice responses (as
indexed by longer choice latencies), they also selected lower
amounts with a higher probability of winning [p(win)] in ‘load’
blocks than in ‘no-load’ blocks in which no signals could occur
[18]. In the double-response group, there was a numerical
difference in the opposite direction; i.e. a tendency to select
higher amounts with a lower p(win) in load blocks than in no-load
blocks. We concluded that stopping-induced motor cautiousness
transferred to monetary choice when gambling.
The potential overlap between control processes could open
new avenues for the treatment of impulse-control disorders
[22,24–26]. Indeed, in two follow-up experiments, we found that
training participants to stop motor responses also influenced
monetary decision-making when stopping and gambling were
separated in time [18]. Those experiments consisted of two phases:
the training phase involved either a stop task or double-response
task (Figure 1) without monetary decision-making; in the test
phase, participants then performed the gambling task without an
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additional cognitive load. The delay between the training phase
and test phase was either two minutes (Experiment 2) or two hours
(Experiment 3). In both experiments, we found that participants
who did the stop task preferred lower amounts with a higher p(win)
in the subsequent gambling task, compared with participants who
did the double-response task or participants who received no
executive-control training. In sum, these results suggested that
training on stopping simple motor responses could have a
sustained after-effect on monetary decision-making.
In the present study, we further explored the longevity of these
training effects by increasing the delay between the training phase
and the test phase. In Experiment 1, the delay between the
training phase and the test phase was 24 hours. In Experiment 2,
we doubled the amount of training: On Days 1 and 2, participants
performed the double-response or stop task, before completing the
gambling task on Day 3.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
This work was carried out at Cardiff University and the
University of Exeter in compliance with ethical standards. The
experiments were approved by the local research ethics commit-
tees at the School of Psychology, Cardiff University (Experiment 1)
and the School of Psychology, University of Exeter (Experiment 2).
Written informed consent was obtained after the nature and
possible consequences of the studies were explained.
Participants
In Experiment 1, sixty volunteers from the Cardiff University
community participated for monetary compensation (£6 per hour,
plus money won in the gambling task; average amount won: £1.1,
range: £0–4.2). In Experiment 2, fifty-two volunteers from the
University of Exeter participated for partial course credit. In each
experiment, sample size, gender, age, and general levels of
impulsivity (assessed by the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale –11) and
risk-taking (assessed by the Stimulating-Instrumental Risk Inven-
tory), were similar for the stop and double-response groups
(Table 1). Participants were informed that they would do different
tasks on consecutive days, but we did not specify the nature of the
tasks in advance.
Procedure
All stimuli were presented on a 19-inch LCD monitor against a
grey background. The task was run using the Psychophysics
Toolbox [27].
Training phase. Both the double-response and stop groups
started with a training phase in which the primary task was to
Figure 1. Examples of no-signal and signal trials in the training phase, and a gambling trial in the test phase (SOA=variable
stimulus-onset asynchrony).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070155.g001
Table 1. Characteristics of participants included in the
analyses (see the Results section for discussion of the
participant exclusion criteria).
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Variable Stop
Double-
response Stop
Double-
response
# participants 30 29 24 24
% female 70 66 88 75
Age 23.0 22.7 19.0 20.0
BIS-Total 64 62 60 65
BIS-Attentional 17 16 16 17
BIS-Motor 23 22 21 23
BIS-NonPlanning 24 24 23 25
SIRI-Total 38 40 38 40
SIRI-Stimulating 22 23 20 22
SIRI-Instrumental 17 18 21 18
Note: The range of possible total scores on the 11th version of the Barratt
Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11; Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995) is 30 to 125;
higher scores indicate more impulsive behaviour. On the Stimulating-
Instrumental Risk Inventory (SIRI; Zaleskiewicz, 2001), scores of 45 and below
indicate a tendency toward avoiding taking risks. Separate scores for the three
BIS-and two SIRI subscales appear below the total score. Note: BIS & SIR data of
four participants in Experiment 1 were missing; in Experiment 2, the BIS data of
one participant was missing. Due to rounding, there are small differences
between the total SIRI score and the sum of the subscales.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070155.t001
Response Inhibition Training and Gambling
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 July 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 7 | e70155
identify a go stimulus (square vs. diamond) as rapidly and
accurately as possible (Figure 1). Participants responded with their
left or right hands, respectively (‘C’ or ‘M’ on a keyboard).
No-signal trials started with the presentation of a fixation circle
for 1.5 sec after which a white non-filled shape appeared around it
(to reduce the overall duration of a session, fixation duration was
0.750 sec in Experiment 2). The shape remained on the screen for
1.5 sec and participants had to respond before it disappeared.
On signal trials, the outline of the shape turned bold after a
variable delay (SOA). In Experiment 1, 25% of trials were signal
trials; 33% of trials were signal trials in Experiment 2. We
increased the percentage of stop signals to encourage proactive
control and cautious decision-making [28]. On signal trials,
participants in the stop group were instructed to refrain from
responding, whereas participants in the double-response group
had to press the space bar as quickly as possible with either thumb
after they pressed ‘C’ or ‘M’. The SOA between the go stimulus
(the shape) and signal was initially set at 0.250 sec. In the stop
group, the SOA was continuously adjusted according to a tracking
procedure that converged on a probability of stopping of.50; in the
double-response group, we simulated a tracking procedure to
produce a similar range of SOAs to the stop group (see ref. 18, for
further details).
The training phase of Experiment 1 consisted of 15 blocks of 56
trials. In Experiment 2, participants completed two training
sessions, each consisting of 10 blocks of 72 trials and with a 24-
hour delay between them. In both experiments, participants
received feedback at the end of each block: they were shown their
mean RT, the number of incorrect and missed responses on no-
signals, and the percentage of failed stops or double-responses
(depending on the group). Participants then paused for 15 seconds
before commencing the next block. In Experiment 1, participants
also received immediate written feedback (presented for one
second) after an error or missed response in the first block.
Test phase. Twenty-four hours after the training, partici-
pants completed a gambling task. On each trial, 6 vertical bars
were presented next to each other; each bar was associated with a
certain amount and a specific key of a keyboard (‘d’, ‘f’, ‘g’, ‘h’, ‘j’,
‘k’; Figure 1). Participants were instructed to select one of the
amounts by pressing the corresponding key, and without revealing
the exact probabilities, they were informed at the beginning of the
experiment that p(win) was lower for higher amounts.
Each trial started with the presentation of the ‘start’ bars,
amounts, and the associated keys. The bars appeared between two
horizontal lines. After 3.5 sec the bars started rising together. All
bars reached the top line after 1.33 sec on ‘low-bar‘ trials, and
after 1.67 sec on ‘high-bar‘ trials (the distance between bottom-
and top line was approximately 7.5 cm on ‘low bar’ trials & 9 cm
on ‘high bar’ trials; both trial types occurred with equal probability
in each block). Trials ended 0.5 sec after the bars reached the top
line. Participants had to execute the choice response before the
end of the trial but not sooner than 0.250 sec. before the bars
reached the top line. Feedback was presented at the end of each
trial, and indicated how much had been won/lost and the current
balance. The feedback screen was replaced by a blank screen after
2.5 sec and the following trial started after a further 0.5 sec. We
originally developed this task to examine stopping and gambling
within a single block (see above). Timing of events, the rise of the
bars, and the height manipulation were dictated by these stop-
related factors; for example, we introduced moving bars to ensure
an optimal stop-signal delay (see ref. 18, for a discussion).
Similarly, we used a single manual response on each trial to
manipulate response inhibition. In order to allow cross-experiment
comparisons, we decided to use the same task across experiments.
On each trial, participants could win or lose points. The exact
amount depended on the stake (low, medium, or high). In
Experiment 1, amounts [with p(win)] participants could win in the
low-stake condition were: 112 (0.15), 64 (0.27), 32 (0.39),16 (0.51),
6 (0.63), 2 (0.75). In Experiment 2, amounts and p(win) were: 64
(0.2), 32 (0.25), 16 (0.325), 8 (0.47), 4 (0.605), 2 (0.875). On losses,
they lost half the chosen amount. Amounts decreased exponen-
tially to make the higher amounts more attractive. We changed
probabilities and amounts in Experiment 2 to ensure that expected
value was the same for the three lower amounts (consequently,
selecting the lowest amount was not disadvantageous). For
medium stakes, all amounts were x 2; for high stakes, amounts
were x 4. Stakes and the left-right order of the amounts varied
pseudo-randomly from trial to trial. The starting balance was 2500
points. In Experiment 1, the total amount won was converted to
money at the end of the study (1000 points =£1), whereas in
Experiment 2 participants played for points only; this change in
pay-off structure was motivated by practical considerations
because we could not let undergraduate students gamble for real
money. Playing for points is common in the literature [29,30] and
pilot work in our lab had shown that we could replicate the
findings observed in Experiment 1 of Verbruggen et al. [18] with a
points-only version of the stop-gambling task.
Data Analyses
For each participant, we calculated a ‘betting score’ by taking the
average of all choices (Range: 1–6). Choice 1 corresponded to the
smallest amount with the highest p(win); choice 6 was the highest
amount with the lowest p(win). Consequently, a higher betting
score indicated that participants preferred higher amounts with a
lower probability of winning.
The analyses focused mostly on the test phase (but see Tables 2
and 3 for an overview of the training data). Test trials with a
response that was not part of the response set, with an anticipatory
response, and trials without a response were excluded; trials that
followed such trials were also excluded. Finally, the first trial of the
experiment was also excluded. In Experiments 1 and 2, 3.9% and
4.2% of the trials were excluded, respectively. After exclusion, we
calculated mean betting score and average choice latency as a
function of group.
All data processing and analyses were completed using R (R
Development Core Team, 2008). Raw data files and R scripts used
for the analyses are deposited on the Open Research Exeter data
repository (http://hdl.handle.net/10871/4461). Because we pre-
dicted that betting scores would be lower in the stop group than in
the double-response group due to a ‘cautiousness transfer’ [18], we
analysed average betting scores with one-tailed Welch t-tests.
When the difference between means is in the predicted direction,
the p-value for the one-tailed t-test = 0.5*p(two-tailed); but when
the difference is in the opposite direction, p(one-tailed) = 1 -
0.5*p(two-tailed). We also calculated Bayes factors for the betting
scores. A Bayes factor compares two hypotheses; in this study these
are: the hypothesis that stop training induces cautiousness when
gambling (the experimental hypothesis) and the null hypothesis
(i.e. no cautiousness induced). Bayes factors vary between 0 and
infinity with values of less than.33 indicating support for the null
hypothesis and values greater than 3 indicating support for the
alternative [31]. Following Dienes [32], we used a half-normal
distribution with a standard deviation of.42, which corresponds to
the numerical difference in betting scores between stop and
double-response groups in Experiment 3 of Verbruggen et al.
[18]. The half-normal distribution was most appropriate here
because it assumes that smaller effects than in our original study
(which included a 2-hour rather than 24-hour delay between
Response Inhibition Training and Gambling
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training and test) are more probable. We calculated the Bayes
factors using the R-version of Zoltan Dienes’ Bayes calculator
(http://www.lifesci.sussex.ac.uk/home/Zoltan_Dienes/
inference/bayes_factor.swf).
Results
Experiment 1
All relevant training data are presented in Table 2. We excluded
one participant in the double-response group from further analyses
because their accuracy on no-signal trials was below 85%.
In the training phase, reaction times were longer and accuracy
was higher on no-signal trials in the stop group than in the double-
response group. This is consistent with our previous findings
[18,28,33], and suggests that participants in the stop group were
more cautious when executing their responses on no-signal trials.
These conclusions were supported by one-way ANOVAs (Table 3).
For the test phase, we compared betting scores in the stop- and
double-response groups (Figure 2). Unlike in Verbruggen et al.
[18], betting scores were not lower in the stop group (M=3.46;
SD=0.84) than in the double-response group (M=3.28; SD= .71),
t(55.962) = 0.919, p=0.819. Thus, there was no detectable transfer
of cautiousness between sessions when the delay between them was
24 hours. Box-plots indicated that this was unlikely to be due to a
few outlying subjects (Figure 2), and a Bayes factor (see Materials
and Methods for explanation) indicated the data provided strong
support for the null, relative to the cautiousness-transfer hypoth-
esis, B=0.249. This indicates that the cautiousness transfer was
indeed absent. Finally, choice latencies were also comparable for
the stop group (M=1514 ms; SD=92) and the double-response
group (M=1522 ms; SD=92), t(56.943)= -0.339, p = 0.632.Thus,
the results of Experiment 1 suggested that completing a single
session of stop training did not influence gambling behaviour after
a 24 hour delay.
Experiment 2
All relevant training data are again presented in Tables 1 and 2.
Three subjects from the double-response group were excluded
because the percentage of missed double-responses was higher
than 15%; one participant in the double-response group was
excluded because accuracy on no-signal trials was below 85%; and
two participants from the stop group were excluded because the
percentage of missed responses on no-signal trials was larger than
15%. After exclusion, there were 24 participants in each group.
Consistent with the results of Experiment 1 and our previous
studies, we found that response latencies were longer and accuracy
rates higher in the stop group than in the double-response group
(see Tables 2 & 3). Again, this demonstrates that participants
become more cautious when they are instructed to stop their
responses occasionally.
We examined whether two days of stop training influenced
gambling behaviour on the third day by comparing betting scores
(Figure 3) and choice latencies for the stop and double-response
Table 2. Behavioural data of training sessions for Experiments 1 and 2.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Session 1 Session 2 t-test
Group Trial DV Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Stop Nosignal RT 591 100 890 205 867 240 1.084
p(acc) 0.975 0.016 0.976 0.026 0.983 0.020 1.214
p(miss) 0.012 0.019 0.036 0.031 0.017 0.018 2.546
Signal p(resp) 0.496 0.007 0.484 0.017 0.488 0.022 1.683
SOA 336 94 654 224 649 253 0.235
SSRT 233 31 225 35 212 29 1.789
Double Nosignal RT 495 59 485 64 434 56 6.973
p(acc) 0.955 0.028 0.958 0.032 0.954 0.037 0.440
p(miss) 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.001
Signal RT 1 522 69 484 63 432 54 6.531
RT 2 533 72 453 61 376 44 10.002
SOA 261 54 457 60 415 52 5.308
p(miss) 0.973 0.033 0.970 0.029 0.990 0.016 3.486
T-tests for Experiment 2 indicate whether the differences between Session 1 and 2 were reliable (t-values larger than the critical t-value with,= .05 are underlined). All
latencies are in ms. DV = dependent variable. RT = reaction time in ms (RT 1 = RT for first response; RT 2 = RT for second response on double-signal trials). Stop-signal
reaction times (SSRT) were estimated using the integration method [38].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070155.t002
Table 3. Overview of analyses of variance, comparing no-
signal performance in the double-response and stop groups.
Experiment DV IV F df MSE p
1 RT Condition 19.79 1,57 6777 ,.001
Acc Condition 11.40 1,57 0.0005 ,.01
2 RT Condition 83.53 1,46 50467 ,.001
Session 10.73 1,46 3051 ,.01
C6 S 1.50 1,46 3051 0.27
Acc Condition 10.67 1,46 0.001 ,.01
Session 0.14 1,46 0.0005 0.71
CxS 1.17 1,46 0.0005 0.28
DV=dependent variable; IV = independent variable. RT = reaction time;
Acc = accuracy.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070155.t003
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groups. Again, cautiousness did not transfer between sessions, as
participants in the stop group (M=3.03; SD= .92) did not develop
a stronger preference for the lower amounts with higher
probability of winning compared with participants in the double-
response group (M=2.66; SD=0.82), t(45.454)=21.492,
p = 0.929. The Bayes factor for betting scores also indicated
strong support for the null hypothesis, which states that
cautiousness does not transfer between training and test phases,
B=0.23. Finally, choice latencies also suggested that there was no
training effect (stop = 1456 ms, SD=66; double-respon-
se = 1470 ms, SD=47), t(41.703)=0.832, p=0.795.
Correlation between Stopping and Gambling
Previous studies found that poor response inhibition predicted
risky decision-making in the Iowa Gambling Task [34–36]. The
link between stopping and gambling or risky decision-making is
also supported by the finding that response inhibition is impaired
in problem gamblers (see above). Here we explored whether stop
performance and betting scores in our gambling task correlated. In
order to have sufficient power, we combined the data of
Experiments 1 and 2. We estimated the covert latency of the
stop process (stop-signal reaction time or SSRT) with the
integration method [37,38], which assumes that the finishing time
of the stop process corresponds to the nth RT, where n= the
number of RTs in the RT distribution multiplied by the overall
p(respond|signal); SSRT can then be estimated by subtracting the
mean SOA from the nth RT. In Experiment 2, we estimated SSRT
for each session separately, and then took the average.
We found a statistically significant positive correlation (r= .32,
p= .017) between SSRT and betting scores: subjects who tended to
exhibit longer SSRTs in the training phase also preferred higher
amounts with a lower probability of winning in the test phase (see
Figure 4). This is consistent with previous findings in the Iowa
Gambling Task (see above). Furthermore, it suggests that, despite
the absence of a transfer of cautiousness between the two tasks,
there is a link between performance in the stop-signal task and
decision-making in the gambling task.
Discussion
We have recently demonstrated that participants preferred
lower amounts with a higher probability of winning in situations
where they expect to stop an initiated motor response (Experiment
1, ref. 18). Furthermore, we have found that training people, even
briefly, in controlling their own motor actions can induce cautious
decision-making for up to two hours afterwards (Experiments 2–3,
ref. 18). These experiments suggest that executive motor control
can transfer to other decision-making domains, in this case
monetary gambling.
In the present study, we further explored the potential of using
the stop task to make people more cautious when making
decisions. Compared with Experiment 3 of Verbruggen et al.
[18], we increased the delay between training and test phases to 24
hours. In two experiments, participants performed either a stop
task or double-response task during training. A comparison
between the two groups showed that the stop group was more
cautious during the training phase than the double-response
group. However, in both experiments, this motor cautiousness did
not transfer to the test phase in which the participants performed
the same gambling task as in our previous gambling studies. We
calculated Bayes factors for both experiments separately, and the
combined Bayes factor was 0.06 (0.249 * 0.234). Thus, the data of
the two studies combined provide ‘very strong’ evidence [31] for
the hypothesis that cautiousness does not transfer from the stop
Figure 2. Average betting scores for the double-response and
stop groups in Experiment 1 (minimum=1; maximum=6). In
each box, the horizontal solid lines show the medians and the asterisks
show the means. The upper and lower ‘‘hinges’’ correspond to the first
and third quartiles. The vertical lines at their respective end points
capture the location of extreme values. There were no outliers (i.e.
values exceeding the interquartile distance by more than 1.5).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070155.g002
Figure 3. Average betting scores for the double-response and
stop groups in Experiment 2 (minimum=1; maximum=6). In
each box, the horizontal solid line shows the median and the asterisk
shows the mean. The upper and lower ‘‘hinges’’ correspond to the first
and third quartiles. The vertical lines at their respective end points
capture the location of extreme values. There were no outliers (i.e.
values exceeding the interquartile distance by more than 1.5).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070155.g003
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task to the gambling task when the delay between the two phases is
increased to 24 hours. Although sleep plays in important role in
declarative and procedural memory consolidation [39], the results
of the present study suggest that stop training does not necessarily
benefit from sleep.
One possibility is that the amount of training of general
inhibitory skills that caused a transfer effect when the delay was
short was not strong enough to illicit changes in behaviour later in
time (although doubling the amount of training did not alter the
results). Guerrieri and colleagues [40] recently reached a similar
conclusion. They examined to what extent performing an
inhibitory control task influenced subsequent eating behaviour,
as several studies have demonstrated that eating disorders
correlate with impairments in inhibitory control [41–44]. They
found that participants who had to respond quickly (the
impulsivity group) tended to eat more during a subsequent bogus
taste test compared with a group who had to stop more and a
neutral baseline control group; importantly, the stop group and
baseline group did not differ. Based on these findings, the authors
concluded that effects of inhibition training may be weaker than
originally assumed.
Alternatively, the results observed in Verbruggen et al. [18]
may not have been caused by training of inhibitory control. Based
on our previous findings, it is tempting to conclude that
performing a short stop task can strengthen the inhibition control
network. However, an alternative explanation is that our previous
results were caused by a task carry-over effect. When participants
perform a stop-signal task, they often make proactive control
adjustments to balance between impulsive responses, which are
difficult to suppress, and slow responses, which can be stopped
more easily [28]. Such control adjustments may involve activating
the stop goal in advance and increasing decision thresholds in the
choice task [28,45,46]. Participants may have adopted a similar
‘proactive’ control strategy when performing the gambling task.
For instance, keeping the overall long-term goal activated (i.e.
‘have as many points as possible at the end of the experiment’)
could result in a more consistent choice pattern; higher decision
thresholds would also result in a more consistent choice pattern. It
seems likely that such a transfer is more likely to occur when the
stop task was executed recently.
A potential limitation of this study is that this is a cross-study
comparison. However, the only difference between the design of
Experiment 1 of the present study and the design of Experiments
2–3 in Verbruggen et al. [18] was the delay between training and
test. Thus, it seems unlikely that differences between the present
study and our previous work are caused by differences in design
other than the delay manipulation. Nevertheless, it is possible that
subtle differences between participants had an influence. People
with poor inhibitory control or problem gamblers may benefit
more from doing a stop-signal task than people who never gamble;
indeed, developmental studies have demonstrated that children
with poor executive control benefited the most from executive
control training [22,47,48]. We did not have a baseline
measurement of gambling or inhibition in our task, so we could
not explore this issue in the current study. Other individual
differences may also have contributed. For example, Colzatto and
colleagues have found that inter-individual genetic variability
modulated transfer between a training and a test task [49]. Thus,
an important avenue for future research is to determine how
individual differences modulate transfer effects.
Another potential avenue for future research is exploring
whether gambling-related stop learning induces longer-lasting
effects. We have previously demonstrated that executive control
processes such as stopping can also be triggered in a bottom-up
fashion by the retrieval of previously acquired stimulus-stop
associations [50]. Other studies have already demonstrated that
such stimulus-stop associations can influence behaviour outside the
lab. For example, it was found that a consistent pairing of alcohol-
pictures to stopping reduced the subsequent weekly alcohol intake
[51] or consumption in the lab [52]. Similarly encouraging
stimulus-specific training effects have been found in food studies
[53,54]. However, future research is required to explore the
potential of such training regimes for various impulse-control
disorders.
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